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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable L.A. Dever, presiding. The Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard G. Fordham, appealed 
to this Court, which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a). This Court, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and issued its written Opinion on February 16, 
2006. Appellant petitioned to this Court for a writ of certiorari which was granted as to the 
following issue: "Whether the court of appeals correctly adopted the 'professional rescuer 
doctrine' and correctly delineated the rationale supporting it and its scope of application." 
This Court now has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a). 
n. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is: "Whether the court of appeals correctly 
adopted the 'professional rescuer doctrine' and correctly delineated the rationale supporting 
it and its scope of application." 
(STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
When the Utah Supreme Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction, it reviews a 
decision of the court of appeals, not a decision of the trial court, and the Supreme Court 
does not grant certiorari to review de novo the trial court's decision. See Butterfield v. 
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Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of 
appeal's decision and is further circumscribed by the issue raised in the petition for 
certiorari. See Colter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852 (Utah 1998). When 
exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals for correctness and applies the same standard of review used by the court 
of appeals. See State ex rel. W.A., 63 P.3d 100 (Utah 2002). 
qSSUE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL) 
The issue as to which certiorari has been granted was preserved for appeal pursuant 
to the issuance of the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, a copy of which is included in 
the Addendum to Appellant's Brief. In reviewing the court of appeals' opinion, the Utah 
Supreme Court applies the same standard of review used by the court of appeals. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves application of the professional rescuer doctrine which prevents 
firefighters and police officers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment 
from recovery based on negligent conduct that requires their presence and assistance. The 
district court granted Defendant-Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of 
the professional rescuer doctrine and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Order 
Granting Summary Judgment issued by the district court. 
The facts are undisputed. Appellant Ryan Oldroyd ("Oldroyd") was involved in a 
single-car rollover accident on December 28, 2003 on the eastbound 600 South offramp 
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from 1-15 in Salt Lake City, Utah, when he lost control of his vehicle as he encountered 
snow and/or ice. (R.2). Following Oldroyd's accident, both Utah Highway Patrol troopers 
and Salt Lake City police officers responded to the scene. Among the Utah Highway Patrol 
troopers responding was the Plaintiff, Richard G. Fordham ("Fordham"). When Fordham 
arrived on the scene, two other highway patrol troopers were already there, as well as one or 
more Salt Lake City police officers. (R.57). Fordham positioned his vehicle in the number 
two eastbound travel lane, and after doing so went to the rear of his highway patrol vehicle 
to retrieve flares. (R.56-58). While doing so, Fordham was struck by another vehicle 
driven by Zhi Wu which encountered ice and/or snow and lost control. (R.42-43). At the 
time Fordham was struck, Oldroyd had been assisted from his vehicle and was in another 
officer's car filling out paperwork. (R.62-63). 
Subsequent to the accident Fordham settled with Zhi Wu, the driver of the vehicle 
which struck him, for her liability insurance policy limits of $50,000.00. Fordham also 
received Worker's Compensation benefits through his employment with the Utah Highway 
Patrol. Appellant's Brief at 6. Fordham filed this action seeking damages from Oldroyd for 
his alleged negligence in connection with the subject incident on December 28, 2003. 
Following the parties' depositions, Oldroyd filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
basis that the professional rescuer doctrine prohibits Fordham from maintaining his action 
against Oldroyd for injuries sustained when Fordham was struck by another driver while he 
was at the scene of Oldroyd's accident in the course and scope of his employment with the 
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Utah Highway Patrol. (R.39-87). After oral argument conducted on March 16, 2005, the 
district court granted Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 163-64). Oldroyd 
appealed to this Court, which poured the case over to the Utah Court of appeals. (R.173). 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion affirming the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on February 16, 2006. (Addendum to Appellant's Brief at 3-15) 
Appellant petitioned for certiorari with this Court which petition was granted on May 24, 
2006. 
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court and, in turn, the court of appeals, properly determined that the 
professional rescuer doctrine bars Plaintiff-Appellant's claim against Defendant-Appellee 
in this case. While application of the professional rescuer doctrine appears to be an issue of 
first impression in Utah, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the 
issue have adopted the professional rescuer doctrine, which provides that firefighters and 
police officers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment may not 
recover based on negligent conduct that requires their presence and assistance. The 
professional rescuer doctrine recognizes that law enforcement officers, such as Fordham, as 
part of their profession, are paid to and voluntarily confront hazards causing injury in return 
for compensation. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that, as a matter of 
public policy, Utah should join the majority of states that have adopted the professional 
rescuer doctrine. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
The professional rescuer doctrine, which was the basis of the district court's Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and of the Utah Court of Appeal's 
Opinion affirming the same, has been defined as follows: 
The "Fireman's Rule" [referred to as the professional rescuer doctrine by the 
Utah Court of appeals] is a widely recognized rule which, where it is 
followed, prevents firefighters and police officers injured in the course of 
their duties from recovering from those whose negligence proximately caused 
their injuries or from the owner or occupant of premises who is responsible 
for creating the condition requiring their presence on the property. The 
Fireman's Rule has been applied to preclude recovery against negligent 
motorists for injuries sustained by police officers which were reasonably 
foreseeable in the course of their duties on the highway. The rule is 
applicable where a police officer is responding to or investigating an 
automobile accident and where an officer is injured as a result of a motorist's 
actions in negligently stopping on a highway. 
Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §691. 
The professional rescuer doctrine is based upon sound public policy considerations, 
and has been adopted by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered 
it. For example, in Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co.. 894 S.W.2d 913 (Ark. 1995) (R. 135-
140), the Arkansas Supreme Court, in a case adopting the "almost universally accepted" 
professional rescuer doctrine, noted that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia 
had adopted the rule while only three states had rejected it either by case law or statute. Six 
years later, in Moody v. Delta Western, Inc., 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002) (R. 142-46), the 
Alaska Supreme Court joined the overwhelming majority of states that have adopted the 
professional rescuer doctrine. In that case, the court noted that, "Nearly all of the courts that 
have considered whether or not to adopt the Fireman's Rule have in fact adopted it." Ld. at 
1140. The court went on to cite cases from thirty-two jurisdictions adopting the rule, while 
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only noting one jurisdiction, Oregon, which had rejected it. 
Public policy considerations supporting the professional rescuer doctrine have been 
discussed in numerous cases from many jurisdictions. For example, in Steelman v. Lind, 
634 P.2d 666 (Nev. 1981) (R. 66-68), the Nevada Supreme Court, in a case factually similar 
to this case, held that the professional rescuer doctrine barred an action by a highway patrol 
trooper against a vehicle owner who had stopped on an interstate roadway to reload 
beehives that had slipped off a trailer. After positioning highway flares, the highway patrol 
trooper, Steelman, was rearended and injured by a vehicle operated by another individual. 
The Court stated: 
Such officers, in accepting the salary and fringe benefits offered for the job, 
assume all normal risks inherent in the employment as a matter of law and 
thus may not recover from one who negligently creates such risk. See e.g. 
Maltmanv. Sauer. 84 Wash.2d 975, 530 P.2d 254 (1975); Burden v. Midwest 
Indus., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Ky. 1964). If this were not the rule, citizens 
would be reluctant to seek aid of a public safety officer or to have such aid 
sought in their behalf upon fear that a subsequent claim for injury by the 
officer might be far more damaging than the initial fire or assault. To hold 
otherwise would create far too severe a burden upon homeowners in keeping 
their premises reasonably safe for the unexpected arrivals of police and 
firemen. 
It was the duty of Steelman, a highway patrol trooper, to take affirmative 
action to protect anyone found in a precarious situation upon the highway 
from additional harm. Action, such as that taken by Steelman, on behalf of 
Lind, a motorist in distress, as well as other motorists travelling upon the 
highway, forms a part of what troopers are hired to do and falls directly under 
the ordinary course of the duties of the occupation. 
For the reasons expressed above, we hold that as a matter of law, appellant is 
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barred by the Fireman's Rule from maintaining an action against Lind and 
affirm the summary judgment. 
634 P.2d at 427-29. 
In Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co.. 569 A.2d 1173 (D.C. App. 1990), the District of 
Columbia Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants in a suit 
involving a firefighter who was injured in an attempt to catch a truck driver as he fell from a 
bridge. Commenting on the rationale supporting the professional rescuer doctrine, the 
Court stated: 
The professional rescuer doctrine (characterized in some jurisdictions as 
the^eman's rule") generally bars those whose business it is to prevent injury 
and save lives from tort recovery for injuries sustained from known hazards 
in the course of their work. Gillespie, 395 A.2d at 20,21. While the doctrine 
originally developed in other jurisdictions in the context of landowner 
liability law, see Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 203, 142 Ca. Reptr. 152, 
154, 571 P.2d 609, 611 (1977), the modem rationale for the doctrine-indeed, 
its basis in the District of Columbia-is that a professional rescuer has 
assumed the risks of his or her employment and is compensated accordingly 
by the public, both in pay and in worker's compensation benefits in the event 
of injury, Gillespie, 395 A.2d at 20. While the reality may be that a 
professional rescuer's pay and benefits are often inadequate to compensate for 
a given injury, the fact remains that a professional rescuer knows before 
accepting the employment both what the risks of the job are and what the 
compensation and benefits will be. The professional rescuer doctrine also 
seeks to avoid a potential proliferation of lawsuits, and thus represents a 
policy decision that the tort system is an inappropriate mechanism for 
compensating professional rescuers injured in the course of their inherently 
risky employment. 
Young, 589 A.2d at 1175. 
In Miller v. Inglis. 567 N.W.2d 253 (Mich. App. 1997), the Michigan Court of 
appeals, commenting on the professional rescuer doctrine stated: 
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Courts in many jurisdictions throughout the United States have adopted a 
common-law rule that bars public safety officials such as firefighters and 
police officers from suing tortfeasors for injuries sustained in the course of 
the public safety officer's employment. The "professional rescuers rule," or 
"the fireman's rule", as it is called in Michigan, Kreskj supra at 357-358,415 
N.W.2d 178, is a creature of the common law, and as such, it has been 
defined and refined case by case. Courts have cited several reasons to justify 
the firemans1 rule—these include the view that (1) rescue officers know the 
dangers of the job when they apply for it, (2) the purpose of the public safety 
profession is to confront danger, and (3) the public should not be held liable 
for damages or injuries that arise from the function that police officers and 
firefighters are intended to fulfill. Kreski supra at 368,415 N.W.2d 178[.] 
567 N.W.2d at 162-63. 
The dissent, in a case cited by Appellant, Lave v. Newmann, 317 N.W. 2d 779 (Neb. 
1982) (R. 107-09), eloquently stated the purposes for and public policy supporting the 
professional rescuer doctrine as follows: 
The Fireman's Rule has withstood attack in other jurisdictions from those 
who misunderstand its genesis and underlying policy. See Walters v. Sloan, 
20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609,142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977), which noted that the 
principle denying recovery to those voluntarily undertaking the hazard 
causing injury is fundamental in a number of doctrines, including nullification 
of the duty of care, satisfaction of the duty to warn because the hazard is 
known, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, as well as in the 
fireman's rule. The rule finds its clearest application in a situation where a 
person who, fully aware of the hazard created by the defendant's negligence, 
voluntarily confronts the risk for compensation. Firemen and policemen are 
paid for the work they perform and are prepared to face the hazards of their 
employment and deal with perils when they arise. When death, injury, or 
disability occurs, compensation is provided not only through the workman's 
compensation law, but, in certain circumstances, by other special benefit 
statutes. 
317 N.W. 2d at 782-83 (Caporale, J., dissenting). 
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Fordham argues that the basic philosophy of Utah tort law and the provisions of the 
Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to 43, require that each 
tortfeasor must pay his or her share of damages caused to a plaintiff by negligence. (Br. at 
14-16). While this is generally the case, there are exceptions in the Code, itself, for 
negligent employers, employees, governmental entities and governmental employees. 
These exceptions are based upon public policy reasons. Similarly, the overwhelming 
majority of states that have adopted the professional rescuer doctrine have done so for valid 
public policy reasons, and not merely under a limited "assumption of risk" analysis as 
suggested by Fordham. In short, there is no violation of the basic philosophy of Utah tort 
law created by application of the professional rescuer doctrine. 
Likewise, the Worker's Compensation statutes, in particular Utah Code Ann. §34A-
2-106, are compatible with the professional rescuer doctrine. Fordham argues that because 
an injured employee is allowed to sue a negligent third party for injuries sustained by the 
employee while on the job, and no exception for firemen or police officers is set forth in the 
statute, application of the Professional rescuer doctrine is inconsistent with this section. 
(Br. at 15). This is not the case. Application of the professional rescuer doctrine precludes 
a duty owed by a negligent citizen to a safety officer called to assist such citizen. In the 
absence of a duty, the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act do not apply. The 
statute states that an injured employee "...may have an action for damages against the third 
person." (Emphasis added). With application to the professional rescuer doctrine, there is 
no duty owed by the negligent citizen to the safety officer, and consequently, no valid claim 
exists. Section 34A-2-106 does not mandate otherwise. 
Fordham cites and quotes five cases in support of his argument that this Court should 
reject the professional rescuer doctrine. (Br. at 16-20). These cases constitute the extreme 
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minority. In Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984) (R. 99-105), the Oregon 
Supreme Court found that the professional rescuer doctrine had been abolished by statute. 
In Banvai v. Arruda. 799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990) (R. 118-20) and in Minnich v. Med-
Waste Inc., 654 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 2002) (R. 122-26), the Colorado Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to adopt the professional rescuer doctrine. 
Finally, in Lave v. Newmann. 317 N.W.2d 779 (Neb. 1982) (R. 107-09) and Levindoskvv. 
Koehn, 841 A.2d 208 (Conn. 2004) (R. 111-16), the Supreme Courts of Nebraska and 
Connecticut acknowledged the professional rescuer doctrine, but limited its scope to private 
premises cases. In contrast, the vast majority of cases that have addressed the issue have 
recognized the rationale behind the professional rescuer doctrine and have adopted it. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that application of the professional rescuer doctrine 
has not precluded Mr. Fordham from recovering damages from the individual who struck 
him, and has not prevented him from receiving benefits under Worker's Compensation, a 
system funded by the public, in place to compensate employees injured in the course and 
scope of their employment. The professional rescuer doctrine precludes suits only against a 
citizen whose ordinary negligence occasioned the presence of the public safety officer. 
Independent acts of negligence that injure a safety officer at the scene, such as the 
negligence of Zhi Wu, the driver who struck and injured Fordham, are not insulated from 
suit. As the Supreme Court of Alaska noted in Moody, supra: 
Jurisdictions adopting the Firefighter's Rule emphasize its narrowness; the 
doctrine bars only recovery for the negligence that creates the need for the 
public safety officer's service. (Footnote omitted.) Thus the Firefighter's 
Rule does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the police officer or 
firefighter arrives at the scene or to misconduct other than that which 
necessitates the officer's presence. (Footnote omitted.) 
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Modem courts stress interrelated reasons, based on public policy, for the rule. 
The negligent party is said to have no duty to the public safety officer to act 
without negligence in creating the condition that necessitates the officer's 
intervention because the officer is employed by the public to respond to such 
conditions and receives compensation and benefits for the risks inherent in 
such responses. Requiring members of the public to pay for injuries resulting 
from such responses effectively imposes a double payment obligation on 
them. Further, because negligence is at the root of many calls for public 
safety officers, allowing recovery would compound the growth of litigation. 
(Footnote omitted.) Courts find an analogy in cases in which a contractor is 
injured while repairing a condition that necessitated his employment. In these 
cases, the owner is under no duty to protect the contractor against risks arising 
from the condition the contractor is hired to repair, and thus is not liable even 
if the condition was the product of the owner's negligence. 
Moody. 38 P.3d at 1141-42. 
The professional rescuer doctrine is a common law recognition that public safety 
officers, such as Fordham, accept compensation from the public for confronting hazards 
and rendering assistance to individuals in need. The rule recognizes that citizens should be 
free to summon help from professional rescuers without concern that they might later be 
sued by the public safety officer if he or she happens to be injured while confronting a 
hazard in the course and scope of his or her employment. To hold otherwise would 
constitute a deterrant to citizens summoning help when in need, and would essentially 
create a double recovery for public safety officers injured in the course of their employment 
while receiving compensation for doing their jobs. 
Finally, Appellant urges this Court to "correct" parts of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
Opinion dealing with duty and causation. Appellant's Brief at 24-26. The court of appeals' 
discussion of duty and causation contains no error requiring correction. The court of 
appeals concluded that adoption of the professional rescuer doctrine in Utah cannot be 
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supported by a rationale based upon a theory of assumption of risk, but went on to note that 
strong public policy arguments, not inconsistent with any legislative pronouncements, form 
the basis for adoption of the rule. The court of appeals correctly determined that the 
professional rescuer doctrine: ".. .recognizes a failure of an essential element of a claim for 
negligence. The rule bars the rescuer's recovery 'for the very valid public policy reason that 
the party or parties who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the 
firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter was employed to confront.' " Utah 
Court of Appeals Opinion at f 19. Citing Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., 894 S.W.2d 913, 
915 (Ark. 1995). 
Similarly, the court of appeals' discussion of proximate cause in the context of 
Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 996 P.2d 531 (Utah 2000) requires no 
correction. The court of appeals noted that in Steiner this Court found that the element of 
causation could not be established where the negligence of a plaintiff occurred before the 
engagement of a professional hired to remedy a situation. The court of appeals simply drew 
an analogy to the facts of Steiner and the facts of the case before it where Mr. Oldroyd's 
alleged negligence occurred before the direct act of negligence of the individual who 
injured Mr. Fordham. Again, the court of appeals did not rely upon any negligence doctrine 
previously found to be inconsistent with Utah's comparative fault statutes but rather relied 
upon public policy considerations in finding that, under the professional rescuer doctrine, in 
circumstances like those present here, where a police officer called to the scene of an 
accident is injured by a third party, the professional rescuer doctrine bars a claim by the 
officer against the person whose negligence resulted in the officer's presence at the scene. 
The court of appeals went on to note the limited nature of the professional rescuer doctrine 
in that it does not bar recovery for subsequent acts of negligence such as that committed by 
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Zhi Wu in this case, but simply precludes the finding of a duty owed by the negligent driver 
to the professional rescuer. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly determined that the professional rescuer 
doctrine is based upon sound public policy principles. Application of the professional 
rescuer doctrine to the facts of this case negate any duty owed by Defendant-Appellee 
Oldroyd to Plaintiff-Appellant Fordham, and the court of appeals, therefore, properly 
upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee. 
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